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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Entrepreneurs with venture ideas must establish cognitive legitimacy so they can acquire 
essential resources needed for survival. We extend the concept of cognitive legitimacy by 
developing a model through which entrepreneurs in emerging high growth organizations 
attempt to establish and build cognitive legitimacy. This is based on the composition of their 
new venture team and advisory board. Novice entrepreneurs can draw on the prestige of their 
new venture team and advisory board to enhance perceptions of their emerging 
organization’s cognitive legitimacy. Novelty of the venture idea moderates relationships 
between both new venture team prestige and advisory board prestige and cognitive 
legitimacy; thus entrepreneurs whose emerging organizations rely on highly novel products 
or services will likely need to establish higher levels of prestige to create cognitive legitimacy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Entrepreneurs with a venture idea must 
convince others to join them in their pursuit 
of opportunities and they need to influence 
potential stakeholders’ perceptions of 
legitimacy (Certo, 2003; Delmar & Shane, 
2004). Individuals, groups and 
organizations (i.e., stakeholders) that have 
contact with an entrepreneur evaluate the 
emerging organization’s purpose and 
legitimacy in order to decide whether or not 
to become involved with the emerging 
organization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Legitimacy, defined as a social judgment of 
acceptance, appropriateness and 
desirability, enables entrepreneurs to 
acquire resources needed for survival 
(Deeds, Mang, & Frandsen, 2004; 
Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman & Zietz, 
2002). Legitimacy helps emerging 
organizations overcome their liability of 
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) by enhancing 
entrepreneurs’ ability to create social ties 
and initiate routines to gain resources 
(Deeds et al., 2004; Delmar & Shane, 2004; 
Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman & Zietz, 
2002).  
 
Entrepreneurship researchers have not fully 
explained the possible strategic behaviors 
entrepreneurs can take to build cognitive 
legitimacy at the earliest stages of a new 
venture’s development. We extend 
Shepherd and Zacharakis’ (2003) work on 
cognitive legitimacy, focusing on the 
process by which initial stakeholders form 
perceptions of an emerging organization’s 
cognitive legitimacy. “The antecedents of 
cognitive legitimacy of an organization are 
the history and prevalence of its particular 
organizational form” (Bitektine, 2011: 
p.160). Novice entrepreneurs—
entrepreneurs lacking prior startup 
experience—do not have a history or a prior 
track record that can help establish the 
cognitive legitimacy of their emerging 
organization. We focus on these novice 
entrepreneurs and on strategies that allow 
them to use the prestige of others to 
enhance the cognitive legitimacy of their 
ventures. Among novice entrepreneurs, 
those who pursue competency-destroying 
innovation (i.e., highly novel venture ideas) 
likely need higher levels of prestige to 
create cognitive legitimacy since their novel 
ideas make it harder for stakeholders to 
place these ventures into a category of 
known organizational forms (Aldrich & 
Martinez, 2001). Thus, novelty of the 
venture idea acts as a moderator, making it 
more difficult for novice entrepreneurs with 
highly novel ventures to establish cognitive 
legitimacy through prestige-building 
strategies than for novice entrepreneurs 
with less novel ventures.  
 
The proposed model explains how novice 
entrepreneurs can establish and build the 
cognitive legitimacy of their emerging 
organizations by “borrowing” prestige (i.e., 
social rank or membership in exclusive 
social networks) from their new venture 
team (NVT) and advisory board members. 
Prestigious affiliations have been shown to 
impact IPO valuations, likely because IPO 
firms involve a considerable amount of 
uncertainty due to their limited track 
records and resources (e.g. Pollock, Chen, 
Jackson, & Hambrick, 2010; Stuart, Hoang, 
& Hybels, 1999). Entrepreneurship research 
on prestige-borrowing by IPO firms have 
increased our understanding of the benefits 
of prestige. But very few startups become 
IPO firms and the sources of prestige 
available to novice entrepreneurs and 
emerging organizations at the earliest stages 
of development likely differ from those 
accessible to IPO firms. For instance, 
statutory boards of directors are typically 
not formed until entrepreneurs seek external 
financing such as launching an IPO. Early 
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stage emerging organizations more likely 
rely on advisory boards rather than statutory 
boards of directors, but advisory boards 
have received relatively little attention in 
the entrepreneurship literature. The model 
proposed here extends research on prestige 
in IPO firms, focusing on the strategic use 
of prestige in advisory boards and new 
venture teams to create cognitive legitimacy 
(and the impact the novelty of the venture 
idea has on this process).  
 
Entrepreneurship researchers tend to view 
legitimacy retrospectively while this paper 
contributes by adopting a proactive 
forward-looking perspective. Survival has 
often been used as an indication of 
legitimacy but this tells us little about how 
emerging organizations establish and build 
cognitive legitimacy: it merely shows or 
assumes an organization has legitimacy 
(Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). The 
perspective adopted here emphasizes how 
entrepreneurs in early stage emerging 
organizations can take strategic actions such 
as selecting prestigious NVT and advisory 
board members in order to create and 
maintain cognitive legitimacy. 
 
We contribute to entrepreneurship research 
that examines the sequencing of organizing 
activities pursued by founders.  We agree 
with Delmar and Shane’s (2004) argument 
that the sequencing of these activities 
matters – founders should initially focus on 
activities to obtain cognitive legitimacy 
because legitimacy, “is a necessary 
precondition to initiating social ties with 
stakeholders and obtaining and recombining 
resources” (p. 386). We extend this 
argument by showing that the 
characteristics of the NVT and advisory 
board play an important part in establishing 
and building cognitive legitimacy in 
emerging organizations. 
 
We begin by defining cognitive legitimacy 
relative to other types of legitimacy. Next, 
we address the process and challenges 
emerging organizations face when 
establishing cognitive legitimacy. We 
integrate the literature to support the 
proposed model and present testable 
propositions of how emerging organizations 
build cognitive legitimacy by creating 
prestigious NVTs and advisory boards.  We 
explain how novelty of venture ideas 
moderates this process. A discussion of the 
implications and limitations of the proposed 
model completes the paper. 
 
COGNITIVE LEGITIMACY 
 
A review of the legitimacy literature reveals 
that although many researchers distinguish 
between different types of legitimacy, little 
consensus exists regarding the various types 
of legitimacy and their scope. However, 
most researchers distinguish cognitive 
legitimacy from other forms of legitimacy 
that fall under the umbrella of sociopolitical 
legitimacy (e.g. Suchman, 1995; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1986; Aldrich, 1999).  
 
Legitimacy resides in the minds of 
observers who may or may not be aware of 
how legitimacy affects their decision 
making (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). These 
observers appear to make two 
fundamentally different types of judgments 
when evaluating organizational legitimacy: 
cognitive legitimacy judgment and 
sociopolitical legitimacy judgment 
(Bitektine, 2011). A cognitive legitimacy 
judgment involves determining whether an 
organization exhibits a set of recognizable 
characteristics that can be used to classify it 
as a member of a certain class of 
organizations. A sociopolitical legitimacy 
judgment evaluates whether the 
organization is socially acceptable (Aldrich, 
1999; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Bitektine, 
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2011; Hannon & Freeman, 1977; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995).  
 
Entrepreneurs in the early stages of forming 
a new venture must pay particular attention 
to establishing cognitive legitimacy, 
showing outsiders that these entrepreneurs 
have gone beyond dreaming and talking 
about starting businesses to engaging in 
startup activities that create new ventures. 
As they struggle to overcome the liability of 
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and develop 
an organization, roles for employees, 
procedures for operating and so on, they 
must find ways to ensure that their new 
ventures look like viable and successful 
businesses. This effort to establish cognitive 
legitimacy may represent a bigger challenge 
for early stage entrepreneurs than creating 
sociopolitical legitimacy: society generally 
regards profit seeking activities as valid 
unless they involve activities prohibited by 
law (Aldrich, 1999; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
Delacroix, Swaminathan, & Solt, 1989; 
Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2003). This 
accounts for the emphasis here on cognitive 
legitimacy judgments about emerging 
organizations. 
 
Establishing Cognitive Legitimacy with 
Prestige 
Entrepreneurship researchers have not fully 
explained how emerging organizations 
build cognitive legitimacy at the earliest 
stages of an emerging organization’s 
development. Katz & Gartner (1988) stress 
the importance of investigating the 
processes underlying the transition from 
emerging organizations or organizations-in-
creation to existing organizations. New 
emerging organizations are not smaller, 
incomplete versions of existing 
organizations because their organizational 
properties are arranged in fundamentally 
different ways (Gartner, Bird, & Starr, 
1992). The emphasis on how to establish 
cognitive legitimacy in the earliest stages of 
emerging organizations distinguishes 
liability of newness from liability of 
smallness. An entrepreneur must establish 
cognitive legitimacy to overcome the 
emerging organization’s liability of 
newness—the lack of structure, policies and 
procedures or ways to deal with regular 
activities--as well as the disadvantages 
faced as a small organization (Stinchcombe, 
1965) such as limited resources.   
 
Entrepreneurship researchers recognize that 
the organizational life cycle needs to 
include stages earlier than when the 
entrepreneur legally creates the organization 
(Hite & Hesterly, 2001). Clarysse and 
Moray (2004) identified two phases that 
precede the initial start-up stage used in 
most organizational life cycle theories: 1) 
the idea phase when the entrepreneur 
conceives of a way to address unmet needs 
in the market and an organization begins to 
emerge; and 2) the pre-startup phase that 
evolves from the idea phase when the 
entrepreneur makes a decision to form an 
organization. At these two early phases, the 
organization faces considerable uncertainty 
and a lack of awareness by outsiders as the 
entrepreneur begins acquiring essential 
resources. 
 
To establish cognitive legitimacy in an 
emerging organization, an entrepreneur 
must generate enough knowledge related to 
the new venture for its existence to be 
taken-for-granted by key stakeholders. 
These stakeholders make cognitive 
legitimacy judgments involving the 
determination of whether the new venture 
exhibits a set of recognizable characteristics 
that can be used to categorize it as a 
member of a certain class of organizations. 
Innovator entrepreneurs—those pursuing 
highly novel ideas or technologies--likely 
face more difficulty in establishing 
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cognitive legitimacy than reproducer 
entrepreneurs. Innovator entrepreneurs start 
organizations involving competence-
destroying innovations that require new 
knowledge, routines, and competencies 
(Aldrich & Martinez, 2001). Stakeholders 
will likely have more difficulty categorizing 
an emerging organization created by an 
innovator entrepreneur because its 
characteristics are more difficult to classify 
and stakeholders may not completely 
understand the innovative entrepreneur’s 
business idea. Therefore, we focus our 
model on explaining the establishment of 
cognitive legitimacy judgments in emerging 
organizations and pay particular attention to 
the challenges faced by innovator 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Shepherd and Zacharakis (2003) identified 
three dimensions of cognitive legitimacy: 
product knowledge, organization 
knowledge and management team 
knowledge. The cognitive legitimacy of 
emerging organizations can be determined 
by measuring the level of knowledge or 
information the public holds regarding the 
emerging organization. Entrepreneurs with 
venture ideas (i.e. individuals in the idea 
phase) often begin with little, if any 
cognitive legitimacy because stakeholders 
have little knowledge and understanding 
regarding the emerging organization 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).  These 
entrepreneurs need to send signals that link 
their emerging organization to categories 
familiar to stakeholders (Fischer & Reuber, 
2007), reducing uncertainty. Cognitive 
legitimacy allows stakeholders to conserve 
cognitive resources associated with 
organizing and searching for additional 
information (Bitektine, 2011; Shepherd & 
Zacharakis, 2003). 
 
Little product knowledge and organizational 
knowledge exist in the idea and pre-startup 
phase of an emerging organization’s life 
cycle. An emerging organization typically 
begins once an individual or small group of 
co-founders decide to pursue a venture idea. 
Individuals considering joining the NVT at 
this initial stage focus on gathering 
information to determine a venture idea’s 
viability (Kamm & Nurick, 1993). As the 
emerging organization develops, product 
knowledge becomes more important, 
followed by organizational knowledge 
which likely consists of aggregated NVT 
knowledge and product knowledge. 
Therefore, we argue that establishing 
cognitive legitimacy during the idea phase 
and pre-startup phase depends mostly on 
knowledge regarding the entrepreneur and 
the NVT.  
 
The task of establishing cognitive 
legitimacy is especially difficult for novice 
entrepreneurs. A novice entrepreneur 
involves someone starting his or her first 
venture, whereas a serial entrepreneur has 
founded multiple ventures (Baron & Ward, 
2004; MacMillan, 1986; Ucbasaran, 
Wright, & Westhead, 2003). Serial 
entrepreneurs have reputations gained from 
their experience with prior ventures and 
receive performance-based rewards based 
on these reputations. Such reputations can 
be used to signal perceived quality when a 
new venture lacks other forms of 
information on quality (Dimov, Shepherd, 
& Sutcliffe, 2007). Reputation and prestige 
(also referred to as status) represent 
distinctly different constructs and both 
serve as a signal of future performance for 
stakeholders. Reputation signals the 
likelihood of strong future performance 
based on past performance in contrast to 
status or prestige that results from an 
organization’s pattern of social relationships 
and the quality of its network partners 
(Dimov et al., 2007).  
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Prestige can be defined as the property of 
having status as derived from membership 
in elite social circles (D’Aveni, 1990); 
defining prestige in terms of status accounts 
for why researchers sometimes use the 
terms prestige and status interchangeably. 
Prestige represents a sociological concept 
capturing differences in social rank while 
reputation, an economic concept, captures 
differences in actual or perceived quality 
among organizations (Dimov et al., 2007; 
Washington & Zajac, 2005). Reputation 
commonly generates performance or merit-
based awards earned by and based on past 
performance of the firm, whereas status 
(i.e., prestige) generates non-performance-
based benefits known as privileges -- 
defined as unearned ascriptions of social 
rank that are not performance-based 
(Washington & Zajac, 2005). Empirical 
research supports distinguishing between 
prestige (i.e., status) and reputation. 
Washington and Zajac (2005) examined the 
impact of status and reputation on the 
likelihood of being invited to the NCAA 
tournament in a current year.  Their results 
indicate that reputation (a basketball team’s 
performance during the year) differs from 
status (the university’s history of invitations 
to the NCAA postseason tournament). 
Teams with a history of being invited to the 
tournament (i.e., high status) received 
privileges beyond the outcomes predictable 
by considering their performance during the 
year (i.e., quality or performance-based 
rewards associated with reputation). This 
shows that prestige differs from reputation. 
 
Prestige and reputation represent two 
different “channels” entrepreneurs can use 
to signal quality (Dimov et al., 2007). 
Novice and previously unsuccessful 
entrepreneurs differ from serial 
entrepreneurs as to which “channel” is 
available. The model proposed here does 
not apply to serial entrepreneurs because 
their reputations (i.e., prior entrepreneurial 
experience) may reduce perceived risk 
associated with a new startup (March & 
Shapira, 1987), likely establishing some 
cognitive legitimacy for the emerging 
organization. Novice entrepreneurs must 
find a way to generate non-performance 
based rewards such as by using prestige. 
Prestige is not based on prior performance, 
so it may exist independently of real quality 
(Washington & Zajac, 2005).   
 
Stakeholders facing uncertainty regarding 
the perceived quality of an emerging 
organization may rely on prestige of those 
associated with the firm (e.g., prestige of 
the NVT or advisory board members) as a 
surrogate for organizational quality 
(Podolny, 1993). Stakeholder decisions to 
provide resources to emerging organizations 
depend on stakeholders’ ties to individuals 
associated with the venture and to the 
credentials of the individuals associated 
with the venture (Florin, Lubatkin, & 
Schulze, 2003). Connecting individuals 
with high prestige to the emerging 
organization may provide a mechanism for 
establishing cognitive legitimacy. We argue 
that the prestige of the entrepreneur, new 
venture team, and advisory board 
communicates information about an 
emerging organization, establishing and 
building cognitive legitimacy - prestige 
generates privileges or unearned ascriptions 
of social rank for an emerging organization 
that are not based on its historical 
performance.  
 
Forming a highly prestigious NVT likely 
enhances the cognitive legitimacy of the 
emerging organization by increasing the 
information available to stakeholders 
(Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2003; Suchman, 
1995). When NVT members have high 
prestige, the perception of status sends a 
signal to external stakeholders that evokes 
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consistent and coherent categories for the 
emerging organization (Fischer & Reuber, 
2007). Entrepreneurs may strategically 
select NVT members with high prestige to 
provide the emergent firm with more 
network ties (Hite & Hesterly, 2001), 
recognizing that “both strong and weak ties 
are useful and contribute to the emergence 
and growth of firms” (Elfring & Hulsink, 
2007: 1852). Novice entrepreneurs need to 
rely on their social networks and those of 
family and friends to identify potential high 
prestige NVT members. Entrepreneurs who 
establish a low prestige NVT provide 
stakeholders with minimal or no 
information. Prestige provides stakeholders 
with some information regarding the 
management team and organization, thereby 
increasing cognitive legitimacy. This leads 
to the following proposition:   
 
P1: NVT prestige relates positively 
to stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
emerging organization’s cognitive 
legitimacy.  
 
In the idea and pre-startup phases of an 
organizational life cycle, entrepreneurs may 
choose to form an advisory board. An 
advisory board may be defined as a group 
of individuals formed to perform service 
and resource dependence roles similar to 
statutory boards (Daily & Dalton, 1992; 
1993; Huse, 1990; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; 
Murray 2003; Whisler, 1988). Although 
operating with similar formality and 
characteristics of a statutory board of 
directors, advisory board members act as 
advisors and thus, represent boards that are 
characterized as advisory rather than 
governing boards (Huse, 2000; Lynall, 
Golden, & Hillman, 2003; Whisler, 1988). 
  
Advisory boards signify voluntary boards 
and are not held to the same liability 
exposure as corporate or statutory boards of 
directors (Mueller, 1988). The increasing 
work load and legal liability for directors on 
statutory boards of directors since the 
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley has made 
advisory boards much more attractive. 
Advisory boards offer a way for emerging 
organizations to gain the expertise, 
connections and access to resources of 
board members without incurring legal 
liability. Forming an advisory board instead 
of a statutory board offers a way to 
eliminate the need for insurance and 
encourages reluctant outsiders to participate 
(Fox, 1982; Ward & Handy, 1988). The use 
of advisory boards has become especially 
common in Silicon Valley in the past 
couple of decades (Morkel & Posner, 2002). 
Emerging organizations typically establish 
an advisory board before a statutory board 
of directors. Firms often form boards of 
directors expressly to satisfy external 
financiers who are needed later in the 
organization’s existence (Fiegener, Brown, 
Dreux & Dennis, 2000). A prestigious 
statutory board of directors can build 
cognitive legitimacy but at a later stage in 
the life cycle of the venture than our model 
covers. 
 
Entrepreneurs may “strategically adapt and 
align their networks to gain the resources 
they need to ensure successful emergence” 
(Hite & Hesterly, 2001: 278), including 
selecting prestigious advisory board 
members. Prior research shows that the 
presence of high status partners adds to 
perceptions of an emerging organization 
(Deutsch & Ross, 2003; Shane & Cable, 
2002).  Boards serve a symbolic role 
independent of their tangible activities 
(Certo, 2003) and social networks. 
Advisory board members with high prestige 
due to their social capital and human capital 
related to areas important to the emerging 
organization can signal information to 
stakeholders regarding the quality of the 
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management team, product, and 
organization, thereby increasing the 
emerging organization’s cognitive 
legitimacy. Novice entrepreneurs may use 
their social networks and those of family, 
relatives, friends and neighbors to identify 
and try to attract prestigious advisory board 
members; in some cases, entrepreneurs have 
even paid prestigious advisory board 
members to become involved with their 
emerging organizations in an effort to build 
cognitive legitimacy. Thus, 
  
P2: Advisory board prestige  
relates positively to stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the emerging 
organization’s cognitive 
legitimacy.  
 
Entrepreneurs enhance their ability to 
develop an advisory board with high 
prestige when the emerging organization 
has a highly prestigious NVT.  Since most 
CEOs rely on their personal networks as the 
source for identifying advisory board 
members (Murray, 2003), the prestige of the 
entrepreneur and other NVT members 
likely impacts the emerging organization’s 
ability to form a prestigious advisory board. 
In addition, prestigious individuals rely on 
the presence of other prestigious individuals 
to validate their own affiliation with the 
organization (Chen, Hambrick, Pollock, 
2008; Podolny, 1994). These individuals 
prefer to associate with other high prestige 
individuals (Podolny, 1994) and avoid 
affiliating with individuals or organizations 
that could reflect poorly on them (Stuart et 
al., 1999).  The prestige of the NVT 
members sends positive signals to 
prospective advisory board members about 
the emerging organization. The following 
proposition states this relationship: 
 
P3: NVT prestige relates positively 
to advisory board prestige. 
A high prestige NVT and a high prestige 
advisory board both signal cognitive 
legitimacy independently. An emerging 
organization may be able to borrow or 
“rent” the prestige of their advisory board to 
enhance their cognitive legitimacy (Deutsch 
& Ross, 2003). The advisory board 
therefore could act as a middleman (i.e., 
partial mediator) between the NVT and 
potential stakeholders. The presence of both 
a high prestige NVT and a high prestige 
advisory board will lead to the highest level 
of cognitive legitimacy for emerging 
organizations. A high prestige NVT 
increases cognitive legitimacy directly and 
also indirectly through the formation of a 
high prestige advisory board. The 
combination of a high prestige NVT and a 
prestigious advisory board sends signals to 
external stakeholders that cue up unified, 
coherent and consistent categories about the 
attributes of the emerging organization 
(Fischer & Reuber, 2007), providing the 
highest level of cognitive legitimacy. 
Establishing a low prestige NVT has a 
definite downside since the entrepreneur 
with a low prestige NVT will have 
difficulty attracting high prestige members 
to the advisory board, resulting in lower 
cognitive legitimacy for the emerging 
organization. Low prestige conveys little 
information to stakeholders facing an 
already uncertain situation (the idea and 
pre-startup phases).  
 
Highly prestigious NVTs are not expected 
to create advisory boards with low prestige 
nor are low prestige NVTs expected to be 
able to create highly prestigious advisory 
boards since both of these scenarios would 
contradict the literature supporting 
Proposition 3. However, if these scenarios 
did occur, the effect would be the same: a 
low prestige advisory board weakens the 
relationship between the highly prestigious 
NVT and cognitive legitimacy; and a 
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prestigious advisory board would strengthen 
the relationship between a low prestige 
NVT and cognitive legitimacy. 
Additionally, some entrepreneurs may 
choose not to form an advisory board. For 
example, a highly prestigious NVT may 
choose not to form an advisory board.  This 
choice reduces the information conveyed to 
external stakeholders when they are 
evaluating the cognitive legitimacy of the 
emerging organization. Creating an 
advisory board enlarges the social network 
and allows individuals from outside the 
organization to provide feedback to the 
emerging organization (Huse, 1990; 
Murray, 2003).  Individuals outside of the 
organization who sit on the board offer 
greater independence and appear to enhance 
venture performance (Daily & Dalton, 
1993; Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000). 
Therefore an emerging organization with a 
prestigious NVT and no advisory board 
results in lower cognitive legitimacy than an 
emerging organization with both a high 
prestige NVT and advisory board. 
Therefore, we propose the following: 
 
P4:  Advisory board prestige  
moderates the relationship between 
new venture team prestige and 
cognitive legitimacy. The 
relationship between new venture 
team prestige and cognitive 
legitimacy will be stronger for 
emerging organizations with high 
advisory board prestige. 
 
Building cognitive legitimacy in emerging 
organizations represents a dynamic process. 
The venture idea, as well as the composition 
of the NVT and advisory board needs to 
constantly adapt to meet the changing needs 
of the emerging organization. The emerging 
organization develops new network ties by 
altering the composition of the NVT and 
advisory board in the early stages of the 
venture (Kamm & Nurick, 1993), if the 
evolving resource needs of the venture 
require a shift in the network structure of 
the venture (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; Hite 
& Hesterly, 2001). The entrepreneur and the 
first members of the NVT provide early 
indications of an emerging organization’s 
cognitive legitimacy. Each activity an 
entrepreneur undertakes during the idea and 
pre-startup phase (such as altering the 
venture idea, building the NVT, adding an 
advisory board, and changing the 
composition of the NVT and advisory 
board) has the potential to impact the 
cognitive legitimacy of the emerging 
organization by providing stakeholders with 
new information.  
 
New information may transform the 
original idea, alter resource requirements or 
suggest changes in the composition of the 
NVT. This sort of adaptation to new 
information may require the removal or 
replacement of NVT members in order for 
the team to function effectively (Kamm & 
Nurick, 1993). The entrepreneur may also 
change NVT members in order to extend 
the new venture’s social network to gain 
greater access to information and resources 
(Hite & Hesterly, 2001). Enlarging the 
advisory board or replacing current 
members with people possessing greater 
prestige and network ties (both strong and 
weak ties) can enhance the emerging 
organization’s cognitive legitimacy with 
certain stakeholders. As an emerging 
organization continues to build cognitive 
legitimacy, the entrepreneur should  find it 
easier to recruit and replace individuals in 
the NVT and advisory board with others 
who have high prestige.  
 
The establishment of a high prestige NVT 
and high prestige advisory board has a 
lasting effect on the new venture. 
Washington and Zajac (2005) explored the 
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evolution of status, noting that once initial 
status is achieved it tends to be perpetuated. 
This likely makes the early establishment of 
cognitive legitimacy based on prestige 
especially critical for the emerging 
organization since it may have long-term 
implications for survival and venture 
success. Therefore, we expect relationships 
among NVT prestige, advisory board 
prestige, and cognitive legitimacy to be 
reciprocal.  Interacting with highly 
prestigious individuals or entities may 
generate privileges (explicitly, the unearned 
ascription of high social rank) for an 
emerging organization, whereas interactions 
across low prestige organizations may yield 
less favorable perceptions or unearned 
ascriptions of low social rank (Washington 
& Zajac, 2005).   
 
An emerging organization that attracts high 
prestige individuals to its NVT at time 
period two creates some cognitive 
legitimacy that makes it easier to attract 
additional prestigious NVT members in 
time period three (shown as a feedback loop 
from cognitive legitimacy to NVT and 
feedback from NVT at time 2 to NVT at 
time 3).  Similar feedback processes occur 
when an emerging organization attracts 
high prestige advisory members in time 
period two, making it easier to add more 
advisory board members with high prestige 
in time period three (shown as feedback 
loop from cognitive legitimacy to prestige 
of advisory board and the feedback loop 
from advisory board at time 2 to advisory 
board at time 3). Thus, acquiring additional 
NVT members and advisory board 
members who have high prestige should be 
easier as an emerging organization gains 
prestigious NVT and advisory board 
members and builds cognitive legitimacy.   
This results in the following proposition: 
 
 
P5: The process of establishing  
cognitive legitimacy is a 
reinforcing process:  a) the 
greater cognitive legitimacy in 
time period 2, the greater NVT 
prestige and advisory board 
prestige in time period 3; b) 
the greater NVT prestige in 
time period 2, the greater NVT 
prestige in time period 3; c) 
the greater advisory board 
prestige in time period 2, the 
greater advisory board 
prestige in time period 3; d) 
the greater advisor board 
prestige in time period 2, the 
greater NVT prestige in time 
period 3. 
 
In addition to characteristics of the NVT 
and advisory board members, the process of 
establishing and building cognitive 
legitimacy in emerging organizations may 
be contingent on characteristics of the 
venture idea. The degree of novelty 
associated with the venture idea pursued by 
an emerging organization has begun 
receiving attention from entrepreneurship 
researchers as a key contextual variable 
(e.g. Amason, Shrader & Tompson, 2006; 
Choi, Levesque & Shepherd, 2007). New 
ventures pursuing highly novel innovations 
appear to require a different mix of strong 
and weak ties than those pursing less radical 
innovations (Elfring & Hulsink, 2003).   
 
The degree of novelty of the venture idea 
likely affects the relationships among NVT 
prestige, advisory board prestige, and 
cognitive legitimacy. Unlike incremental 
innovations which involve small 
improvements to technology that is 
currently available, radical innovations (or 
disruptive innovations) involve innovations 
that encompass a high degree of new 
knowledge (Dewar & Dutton, 1986: 1442).  
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A novel or highly creative product 
represents one in which a clear path does 
not exist: no one has accomplished this task 
before so no heuristic exists for how to do 
so (Amabile, 1996). Entrepreneurs with 
highly novel venture ideas—those working 
in highly uncertain or unknown areas--face 
greater challenges in creating cognitive 
legitimacy, making prestige of their NVTs 
and advisory boards more critical than for 
ventures pursuing more imitative ideas.   
Emerging organizations often face 
substantial resistance when introducing 
radical innovations, in part, because many 
of them fail. “Like biological mutations, 
radical innovations crop up sporadically, 
but very few have the qualities that lead to 
long-term survival” (Utterback, 1994: 162).  
As the novelty of the venture idea increases, 
the NVT must spend more time processing 
information (Amason et al., 2006) and 
communicating explicit knowledge to the 
firm’s external stakeholders (Choi et al., 
2007). Entrepreneurs relying on radical 
innovations face greater problems 
establishing legitimacy and may need to 
rely on larger networks of diverse weak ties 
whereas ventures using incremental 
innovations can rely on close networks of 
strong ties (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007). This 
suggests that novice entrepreneurs pursuing 
radical innovations will likely need to create 
and use larger social networks in order to 
locate highly prestigious individuals for 
their NVTs and advisory boards. 
 
Highly novel venture ideas involve products 
in which individuals lack a frame of 
reference for understanding what the 
product is and what benefits it offers above 
that of products existing in the marketplace 
(Athaide, Meyers, & Wilemon, 1996; 
Slater, 1993). Utterback (1994) 
demonstrates the importance of a 
prestigious NVT member with his example 
that incandescent lighting might not have 
been viewed as a viable new product by 
businesses providing gas lighting, except 
that it was introduced by Thomas Edison 
who gave the new idea credibility. An 
entrepreneur pursuing a novel idea could 
benefit greatly from a similar type of 
association with a high prestige individual 
on the NVT or advisory board. Less 
prestigious individuals likely have great 
difficulty convincing people of a highly 
novel product’s viability. Thus, the creation 
of a prestigious NVT and/or advisory board 
will be even more helpful in establishing 
cognitive legitimacy when the emerging 
organization involves a high novelty 
venture idea. We propose the following: 
 
P6: The novelty of venture idea  
moderates the relationship between 
prestige (both NVT and advisory 
board) and cognitive legitimacy.  
The relationship between prestige 
and cognitive legitimacy will be 
stronger for emerging 
organizations exploiting high 
novelty venture ideas. 
 
The proposed model (see Figure 1) applies 
to high growth emerging organizations prior 
to external financing, started by novice 
entrepreneurs. Those novice entrepreneurs 
who pursue highly innovative ideas will 
need greater levels of prestige to establish 
cognitive legitimacy.  High growth 
emerging organizations are defined as those 
emerging organizations “where significant 
sales and profit growth are expected to the 
extent that it may be possible to attract 
venture capital money and/or funds raised 
through public or private placement” 
(Ronstadt, 1984: 75).   High growth 
emerging organizations typically create an 
advisory board and obtain external 
financing at some point in their 
organizational life cycle. Emerging 
organizations without the motivation to 
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grow have little need for an advisory board 
or external financing.  Cognitive legitimacy 
issues and the type of social network ties 
needed by the organization will change as 
the new venture moves from the emergent 
to the start-up stage. 
 
Figure 1: A Dynamic Model of Establishing Cognitive Legitimacy with Prestigious New 
Venture Team and Advisory Board Members. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This paper represents one of the first 
attempts to examine how entrepreneurs 
might pursue a strategy of “borrowing” 
prestige to help their emerging 
organizations establish cognitive 
legitimacy. We develop a model that 
explains the process of establishing and 
building cognitive legitimacy by recruiting 
prestigious NVT members and prestigious 
advisory board members.  High prestige 
NVT and advisory board members can also 
enhance the cognitive legitimacy of 
emerging organizations pursuing highly 
novel venture ideas. Although we  
acknowledge that cognitive legitimacy is 
 
not the only factor impacting whether an  
emerging organization evolves into a 
successful new venture, we believe that it is 
a crucial obstacle that innovator 
entrepreneurs must deal with to overcome 
their liability of newness.  
 
The proposed model applies to “emerging 
organizations”, those at a very early stage of 
development when an entrepreneur with a 
venture idea begins to form an organization. 
We join research that explores actions 
entrepreneurs can take to proactively build 
legitimacy (e.g., Liao and Gartner, 2007). 
We answer the call for research that 
explains how theories and models 
developed for more established ventures 
 P5b + P5a + 
P5d  + 
P6 + 
P5a + 
P3 + 
P2 + 
P1 + 
Advisory Board 
Prestige 
 
Cognitive  
Legitimacy  
Novelty of  
Venture Idea 
New Venture Team 
Prestige 
P4 + 
P5c + 
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likely differ when applied to emerging 
organizations (Katz & Gartner, 1988). We 
expect many concepts examined in more 
established organizations are likely to be 
even more critical to firm survival and 
performance in the earliest stages of an 
organization’slife. 
 
Researchers have attempted to measure 
legitimacy using indirect measures related 
to the source of legitimacy, such as winning 
certification tests (Rao, 1994), entering into 
alliances (Stuart et al., 1999) and being 
mentioned in the press (Deeds et al., 2004). 
This practice treats prestige and legitimacy 
as identical constructs. We distinguish 
legitimacy from its sources (i.e., prestige) 
and explain how prestige impacts cognitive 
legitimacy in the absence of reputation. 
Successful serial entrepreneurs may rely on 
their reputations to generate cognitive 
legitimacy, but novice entrepreneurs do not 
have this advantage. Novice entrepreneurs 
need to create sources of information that 
help them establish awareness and reduce 
uncertainty among stakeholders of the 
emerging organization. We argue that key 
factors affecting the amount of information 
conveyed to stakeholders include 
characteristics of the individuals involved 
with as well as characteristics of the venture 
idea.     
 
High levels of prestige have been shown to 
decrease the likelihood of bankruptcy 
(D’Aveni, 1990) and organization 
dissolution (Pennings, Lee, Van 
Witteloostuijn, 1998), as well as increase 
CEO compensation (Belliveau, O’Reilly, 
Wade, 1996) in established organizations.  
We extend prior research by proposing how 
prestige applies in an entrepreneurial 
context, and by going beyond the 
entrepreneur to include new venture teams 
and advisory boards.   
 
For entrepreneurship researchers, we 
suggest that the formation of the NVT and 
advisory board should be included among 
key organizing activities initially pursued 
by founders. We focus on how advisory 
boards can be utilized in a similar fashion as 
NVTs to further aid in the establishment 
and building of cognitive legitimacy. There 
is a need for research to explore how 
advisory boards impact new venture 
performance, especially since advisory 
boards offer important advantages since 
Sarbannes-Oxley. Researchers need to 
distinguish advisory boards from boards of 
directors -- that entrepreneurs typically 
form in a later stage of venture 
development.  
 
Our model stresses the importance of 
looking beyond the entrepreneur and 
examining the impact of all the individuals 
associated with emerging organizations.  It 
is important to consider what benefits these 
individuals provide the emerging 
organization beyond advice and expertise.  
Scholars suggest that entrepreneurs form 
advisory committees (e.g. Timmons & 
Spinelli, 2007; Kuratko & Hodgetts, 2004); 
however, they do not provide effective 
strategies for advisory board member 
selection nor explain how advisory boards 
may impact survival.  We argue that in 
addition to the valuable advice advisory 
board members play, they can also generate 
“privileges”: unearned ascriptions of social 
rank that signal cognitive legitimacy.  
 
While the main focus of this article involves 
how entrepreneurs of emerging 
organizations can use (high prestige NVT 
and advisory board members, our model 
also has implications for social network 
research in entrepreneurship. Researchers 
note that resource needs of new ventures 
change during the emergence stage so
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entrepreneurs likely need ways to alter their 
network ties (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). Few 
researchers have addressed “the actual 
function and utility of network ties (Jack, 
2005: 1254).  We show that entrepreneurs 
may assess the potential and realized 
benefits of their network ties, adding some 
new ties and dropping other ties (Elfring & 
Hulsink, 2007): an entrepreneur striving to 
increase cognitive legitimacy should add 
high prestige NVT and advisory board 
members and drop those with low prestige. 
 
The primary objective of this paper is to 
suggest a limited-domain theory.  By 
design, we advance a formal argument that 
considers emerging organizations with little 
if any cognitive legitimacy and offer 
propositions that suggest strategies, 
relationships, and probable outcomes.  
However, this theoretical framework 
exploring cognitive legitimacy and its 
sources is not limited to high tech emerging 
organizations. Other examples of high 
growth ventures could include new 
franchise systems. Although we examine 
how the novelty of a venture idea moderates 
the relationship between both NVT and 
advisory board prestige and the cognitive 
legitimacy of the emerging organization, 
other factors may also moderate these 
relationships. Commitment may have a 
moderating effect, and is defined as 
behaviors that bind an individual to others 
(Stone & Brush, 1996). An advisory board 
that is committed to a NVT would likely 
enhance its cognitive legitimacy as 
compared with an advisory board that does 
not exhibit high levels of commitment. Our 
model implies that entrepreneurs may focus 
on cognitive legitimacy building strategies 
at the earliest phases of the nascent venture 
and these efforts will assist them in 
developing commitment among internal and 
external stakeholders (Stone & Brush, 
1996). 
We also expect a moderating relationship 
between reputation earned due to prior 
success as an entrepreneur and cognitive 
legitimacy.  In the Bayesian view, priors are 
experiential (Norton & Moore, 2006), 
which suggests a contextual limitation.  
Priors--successful serial entrepreneurs--may 
moderate only to the extent that they 
capitalize on domain-specific competencies 
or start new ventures in the same industry as 
their prior successes. Alternatively, priors 
could be conceptualized as a source of 
cognitive legitimacy rather than a 
moderating variable. Very successful serial 
entrepreneurs likely benefit from creating a 
prestigious NVT and advisory board (due to 
the non-performance based rewards prestige 
generates in addition to the performance 
based rewards their reputation generates). 
We do not include successful serial 
entrepreneurs in our model but this stage 
model affords researchers meaningful 
control over the articulated variables. 
Theoretical refinement and empirical 
examination of this model should increase 
our understanding of the process of 
establishing cognitive legitimacy. 
 
Researchers need to consider possible 
limitations of the model. Although we focus 
on establishing and building cognitive 
legitimacy through the composition of the 
NVT and advisory board, we acknowledge 
other research shows an emerging 
organization has other possible means for 
improving its legitimacy (e.g. Zimmerman 
and Zeitz, 2002; Elfring & Hulsink, 2003).  
Empirical research is needed to test the 
propositions in our model and to determine 
whether these relationships generalize 
beyond high growth emerging 
organizations.  However, the objective of 
this study involves refining and extending 
existing models and insights.  We 
encourage future research to test the 
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propositions presented and develop theory 
that extends them. 
 
Testing the propositions presented in this 
article requires operationalization of 
cognitive legitimacy, novelty of venture 
idea, and prestige. Aldrich and Fiol (1994) 
argue that cognitive legitimacy can be 
assessed by measuring the level of public 
knowledge about a new activity. Consistent 
with Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002), we 
consider cognitive legitimacy as a 
continuous variable ranging from zero to 
very high levels of legitimacy, not as a 
dichotomous variable where emerging 
organizations either have legitimacy or do 
not. Cognitive legitimacy requires 
measurement of the extent of stakeholders’ 
awareness of the emerging organization’s 
product, organization, and management 
team (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2003; 
Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).  Stakeholders could 
be asked to rate the level of knowledge 
regarding these three dimensions. The 
novelty of venture idea has been assessed 
by having researchers rate the level of 
innovativeness and then determining inter-
rater reliability (e.g. Shepherd & Detienne, 
2005, Amason et al., 2006).  The method 
appears to adequately measure novelty of 
venture ideas and could be used in testing 
the proposed model.   
 
Prestige has been measured in a number of 
studies regarding boards of directors (e.g. 
Certo, 2003, Lester, Certo, Dalton, Dalton, 
& Cannella, 2006), yet further work is 
required to adapt these measures to NVT 
and advisory boards.  Similar to Dimov and 
colleagues (2007), research could measure 
prestige using centrality measures common 
in social network studies. Eigenvector 
centrality is used when the status (i.e., 
prestige) of an actor is a function of the 
status of those with which he or she is 
connected (Bonacich, 1972).  A high 
eigenvector score indicates the focal actor is 
connected to well-connected “others”, 
whereas someone that is connected to 
“isolates” would have a low eigenvector 
score even if he or she had a high degree 
centrality score (Borgatti, 1995).  High 
average eigenvector centrality of NVT and 
advisory boards indicates high prestige.  
The proposed model applies to high growth, 
emerging organizations created by 
innovator entrepreneurs. Therefore, the 
sample needed to test the proposed model 
needs to capture entrepreneurs who pursue 
competency destroying innovations in the 
earliest stages of organization formation.  
Researchers may identify these 
organizations using the suggestions 
presented by Katz and Gartner (1988).  Data 
regarding the novelty of the venture idea 
and prestige may be obtained using 
information typically provided in a business 
plan, whereas cognitive legitimacy may be 
captured by surveying potential 
stakeholders of the emerging organizations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Emerging organizations need to establish 
legitimacy to acquire resources necessary 
for survival.  However, few researchers 
have addressed how emerging organizations 
build legitimacy, more specifically, 
cognitive legitimacy. Many factors impact 
emerging organizations’ ability to survive 
(e.g., environmental and industry forces), 
but we chose to focus on factors within the 
control of the entrepreneur at the very 
beginning of the life cycle of an emerging 
organization. Researchers have noted that, 
“the entrepreneurial team is a relatively 
controllable entity. “If well understood, the 
process of team formation could be shaped 
to enhance ventures’ chances of success” 
(Forbes, Borchert, Zellmer-Bruhn & 
Sapienza, 2006: 226).  The choices of NVT 
and advisory board members impact how 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                                         Vol. 23, No. 1 
86 
stakeholders perceive the emerging 
organization. Relationships among NVT 
prestige, advisory board prestige, and 
cognitive legitimacy merit study since 
educators advise entrepreneurs to form 
NVTs and advisory boards but do not 
discuss effective strategies for their 
formation or explain how they may impact 
survival in the earliest stages of the 
organizational life cycle. Research on 
advisory boards, such as investigating the 
model proposed here, has clear implications 
for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs could 
benefit greatly from knowing more about 
how to effectively create and use NVTs and 
advisory boards to establish cognitive 
legitimacy.   
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